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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shane Roy Denton appeals his judgment of conviction upon a jury's guilty 
verdict for attempted strangulation. Although he did not object at trial, Denton 
argues the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument that 
amounted to fundamental error requiring reversal. However, Denton fails to 
meet his burden of establishing the requisite elements for fundamental error. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Denton with felony attempted strangulation. (R., pp. 
65-66.) The victim is Denton's wife, Helena Denton, with whom he lived at the 
time of the crime. (R., p. 66; Vol. II Tr., p. 5, L. 22 - p. 6, L. 8; p. 9, L. 25 - p. 10, 
L. 6. 1) Helena testified at trial that she and Denton were having marital problems 
and got into a verbal argument. (Vol. II Tr., p. 11, L. 11; p. 12, L. 22 - p. 15, L. 
20.) When Helena took a step away from Denton, he "grabbed [her] by the 
throat." (Vol. II Tr., p. 16, L. 12 - p. 17, L. 7.) Denton, who is 6'2" and 210 lbs, 
then picked up Helena, who was 94 lbs, and slammed her to the ground. (Vol. II 
Tr., p. 19, Ls. 8-25.) At that time, Helena was about six weeks pregnant with 
Denton's child. (Vol. II Tr., p. 7, Ls. 5-7; p. 88, Ls. 10-11.) 
Helena's 16 year old son from a prior relationship arrived shortly after the 
attempted strangulation. (Vol. II Tr., p. 29, Ls. 1-10.) Helena "was having really 
1 Consistent with Appellant's brief, this Respondent's brief shall cite to the 
Transcript as follows: Vol. I - Voir Dire, Openings, Jury Instructions, Return of 
Verdict; Vol. II - Trial, Closings. 
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bad cramping, and ... still couldn't catch [her] breath," so her son helped her get 
to the emergency room. (Vol. II Tr., p. 32, Ls. 10-25.) 
At the hospital, Helena told the doctor she had been "assaulted by her 
estranged spouse while at home." (Vol. II Tr., p. 83, Ls. 22-23.) She told the 
doctor that Denton "grabbed [her] by the neck and lifted [her] up off the ground" 
then threw her on her back and continued to strangle her. (Vol. II Tr., p. 83, L. 
24 - p. 84, L. 2.) Helena also told the doctor she "was having difficulty 
swallowing and neck discomfort." (Vol. II Tr., p. 84, Ls. 8-9.) The doctor noted 
"abrasions and bruising ... on the left side of [Helena's] neck." (Vol. II Tr., p. 87, 
Ls. 2-3.) Helena declined a CT scan after the doctor discussed with her "the 
risks of radiation exposure at that time in her pregnancy." (Vol. II Tr., p. 88, Ls. 
5-6.) A police officer who had interviewed Helena also testified at trial, 
confirming Helena's report of Denton's attempt to strangle her. (Vol. II Tr., p. 
135, L. 25- p. 136, L. 2.) 
A jury found Denton guilty. (R., p. 198.) The district court sentenced 
Denton to a unified term of eight years with three years fixed. (R., pp. 275-80.) 
Denton timely appealed. (R., pp. 281-83.) 
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ISSUE 
Denton states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of 
fundamental error by misstating the law, vouching for a witness, 
and disparaging defense counsel. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




Denton Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error As To His Unpreserved 
Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Denton argues the prosecutor committed misconduct that infringed on his 
right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, p. 1.) Although the alleged misconduct was 
not objected to at trial, Denton asserts it rose to the level of fundamental error 
thus warranting reversal. (Id.) Applying Idaho case law to the record, Denton 
fails to satisfy his burden on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where, as here, a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly 
improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for 
prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged 
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 222-23, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 974-75, 980 (2010). For this, a defendant must 
show error that (1) violates an unwaived constitutional right, (2) is clear or 
obvious from the appellate record, (3) and that affected the outcome of 
defendant's trial. kt at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. "[P]rosecutorial misconduct during 
closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the comments were so 
egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been 
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments 
should be disregarded." State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 170-71, 191 P.3d 244, 
248-49 (Ct. App. 2008). 
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C. Denton Has Not Shown The Prosecutor Committed Error, Let Alone 
Fundamental Error In Closing Argument 
The purpose of closing argument is "to sharpen and clarify issues for 
resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case." Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 
853, 862 (1975); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 
2007). A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument. State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009); State v. Porter, 130 
Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 
P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). But a prosecutor may not "attempt[] to secure a 
verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and 
the evidence admitted during trial" and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
as doing so, "impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. 
Denton argues the prosecutor committed three instances of misconduct 
during closing argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-11.) As to each, Denton has 
failed to meet his burden of showing the requisite elements under Perry are 
satisfied. 
1. Denton Has Not Demonstrated Fundamental Error Through A 
Misstatement Of Law By The Prosecutor During Closing 
Denton asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal-
closing by misstating the law regarding the use of hearsay. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 6-8.) "It is prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law in 
closing arguments." Coffin, 146 Idaho at 170, 191 P.3d at 248 (citation omitted). 
The prosecutor's disputed comments addressed defense counsel's closing 
5 
argument that Helena's statements to the emergency room physician and police 
officer were inconsistent. 
At trial, the emergency room physician and police officer, both of whom 
spoke with Helena after the attempted strangulation, testified about hearsay 
statements Helena made to them. (Vol. II Tr., p. 83, L. 4 - p. 84, L. 17; p. 138, 
L. 14 - 139, L. 19.) The doctor's evaluation notes were admitted in evidence as 
Defendant's Exhibit C, and the officer's Affidavit of Probable Cause was admitted 
(as an exception to hearsay per Rule 803(8)(A)) as Defendant's Exhibit D. (Vol. 
II Tr., p. 94, Ls. 10-16; p. 148, L. 14 - p. 151, L. 16.) Under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 806, when a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, "the 
credibility of the declarant may be attacked, ... [and] [e]vidence of a statement 
or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with declarant's hearsay 
statement, is not subject to any requirement that declarant may have been 
afforded an opportunity to deny or explain." I.R.E. 806. 
In rebuttal-closing, the prosecutor said: 
[Defense Counsel] wants you to believe that there is [sic] 
inconsistencies in Helena's story ... [he] had Helena on the stand, 
didn't he? 
But he never challenged Helena on [her story] .... 
What does he do? He waits and gets Officer Gates on the 
stand and says, Helena told you this and that's inconsistent, isn't 
it? 
(Vol. II Tr., p. 210, L. 13-p. 211, L. 2.) The prosecutor then argued: 
You can't use double hearsay to prove somebody is 
inconsistent. You have to ask the person who made the comment 
and allow them to respond. 
(Vol. II Tr., p. 211, L. 12.) Denton contends these comments misstated the law, 
contrary to Rule 806. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-8.) According to Denton, the 
6 
comments incorrectly instructed the jury that: (1) because the officer's testimony 
was double hearsay, it could not be considered; and (2) to use Helena's hearsay 
statements to demonstrate inconsistency, defense counsel was required to allow 
Helena to respond. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-8.) However, this argument 
mischaracterizes the prosecutor's comments. 
The disputed statements here were made as part of the prosecutor's 
greater rebuttal-closing that argued to the jury what the evidence showed or did 
not show. (See Vol. II Tr., p. 208-17.) The prosecutor's statements did not 
instruct the jury about the law. Rather, the statements were rebuttal argument 
that the evidence failed to demonstrate Helena's accounts of events were 
inconsistent. "Prosecutors are entitled to ask jurors to draw inferences from the 
trial evidence, including inferences about a witness's credibility." State v. 
Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, _, 297 P.3d 257, 266 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations 
omitted). 
Even though defense counsel was not required by the rules to ask Helena 
about the alleged inconsistencies in her statements, it was proper for the 
prosecutor to point out that this inquiry did not happen. See State v. Dudley, 104 
Idaho 849, 852, 664 P.2d 277, 280 (Ct. App. 1983) (proper to argue adverse 
inference from failure to present particular admissible evidence). Likewise, it 
was proper to point out that the allegedly inconsistent statement was double 
hearsay, thus the inconsistency might be attributable to the office rand not 
Helena. The prosecutor's arguments were proper, and to any extent they might 
be objectionable, do not rise to constitutional error. 
7 
Because Denton failed to object at trial, he must show that prosecutorial 
misconduct is "plain, clear, or obvious" from the record to satisfy the second 
prong of the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376, 381, 
256 P.3d 784, 789 (Ct. App. 2011). Taken in context, it is far from plain, clear, or 
obvious that the prosecutor's comments were intended, let alone interpreted, as 
statements of law. It is therefore not plain, clear, or obvious that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct. 
Even if Denton could show clear misconduct, he cannot establish 
fundamental error because he cannot demonstrate the third prong - that the 
prosecutor's comments affected the outcome of his case. "We presume that the 
jury followed the district court's instructions." State v. Iverson, 155 Idaho 766, 
_, 316 P.3d 682, 692 (Ct. App. 2014). Here, the court instructed the jury as to 
the law, including: 
The evidence you are to consider consists of: sworn 
testimony of witnesses; exhibits which have been admitted into 
evidence; and any facts to which the parties have stipulated . 
. . . The lawyers are not witnesses. What they say in their 
opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is 
included to help you interpret the evidence but is not evidence. 
(Vol. I, p. 168, L. 22 - p. 169, L. 7.) The court also instructed, "If anyone states a 
rule of law different from any I tell you, it is my instruction that you must follow." 
(Vol. I, p. 168, Ls. 15-17.) Because we presume that the jury heeded these 
instructions, Denton has failed to show the prosecutor's statements - allegedly 
instructing the jury incorrectly as to the law - impacted the outcome of his case. 
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2. Denton Has Failed To Show Prosecutorial Misconduct By Vouching 
Denton argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for 
testimony by the emergency room physician, Dr. Ellsworth. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 9-10.) It is improper for a prosecutor to "vouch for a witness by placing the 
prestige of the state behind the witness." State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368, 
233 P.3d 1286, 1290 (Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). "Closing argument 
should not include counsel's personal opinions and beliefs about the credibility of 
a witness." ls!:. at 369, 233 P.3d at 1291 (citations omitted). In this case, the 
prosecutor did not offer a personal opinion or belief about the credibility of Dr. 
Ellsworth, nor did he otherwise place the prestige of the state behind her. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor said Dr. Ellsworth took notes of what 
the victim (Helena) told her, then stated: 
Why isn't that hearsay under Idaho law? Because it's believed that 
any statements you make to a doctor are statements that you make 
to tell them about your injuries. 
(Vol. II Tr., p. 182, Ls. 6-8.) This is a correct statement of the law. I.RE. 803(4). 
Denton does not argue otherwise. Where a prosecutor makes "a correct 
statement of law and ... factual reference ... grounded in the evidence," there 
is no misconduct. Felder v. Dickhaut, 968 F.Supp.2d 334, 345 (D. Mass., 2013). 
As already noted, "[p]rosecutors are entitled to ask jurors to draw inferences from 
the trial evidence, including inferences about a witness's credibility." 
Frauenberger, 154 Idaho at_, 297 P.3d at 266. Also, prosecutors may suggest 
that the jury consider common sense in rendering credibility determinations. 
Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 370, 233 P.3d at 1292. 
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Even if Denton could establish the prosecutor committed plain, clear, or 
obvious misconduct by vouching, to satisfy the second prong of a fundamental 
error analysis, he cannot show the alleged vouching affected the outcome of his 
trial. Again, we presume the jury follows the court's instructions regarding the 
law. Iverson, 155 Idaho at_, 316 P.3d at 692. Here, the prosecutor correctly 
articulated the exception to hearsay for statements made for purposes of 
medical treatment. Any danger that the jury could have perceived the statement 
as an instruction to "find Dr. Ellsworth's testimony credible ... as a matter of law" 
(Appellant's brief, p. 10), was balanced by the court's instruction not to consider 
the attorneys' arguments as evidence, and to follow the court's instructions 
regarding the law. (See Vol. I, p. 168, L. 15 - p. 169, L. 7.) Accordingly, Denton 
has failed to establish fundamental error by prosecutorial vouching. 
3. Denton Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Amounting To Fundamental Error By Disparagement Of Defense 
Counsel 
Finally, Denton contends the prosecutor improperly disparaged defense 
counsel during closing argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) It is "misconduct 
for the prosecution to make personal attacks on defense counsel in closing 
argument." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 19, 189 P.3d 477,481 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003)). Also, it 
is improper to disparage defense counsel by unfairly casting defense counsel's 
role. State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 657, 691 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Ct. App. 1984). 
However, "[a] prosecutor has every legitimate right to point out weaknesses in a 
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defendant's case," which "can be done in many ways without attacking the 
defendant's counsel." l!;L 
Denton challenges the prosecution's statements in closing: 
[Defense counsel] never challenged Helena on any of those 
[inconsistent statements]. He didn't pick it up and say, didn't you 
say here in your statement da-da-da-da-da-da. He never asked 
her because he didn't want her to say, that's not what I said. 
What does he do? He waits and gets Officer Gates on the 
stand and says, Helena told you this and that's inconsistent isn't 
it? ... 
. .. So if you can't point out discrepancies in somebody's 
testimony to that person, let's use somebody else . 
. . . You know, if you can't break your witness, if you can't 
make them say something inconsistent, what do you do? You go 
after law enforcement. So sure enough, let's go after Officer 
Gates. 
(Vol. II Tr., p. 210, L. 20- p. 211, L. 14; p. 212, Ls. 19-22; Appellant's brief, pp. 
10-11.) Comparing this case to Baruth, Denton contends "the prosecutor's 
misconduct ... is clear from the record." (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) It is not. 
In Baruth, the prosecutor's disputed statements included casting defense 
counsel as a "market[er]. .. , package[r] ... , and huckster" of "doubt." 107 Idaho at 
657, 691 P.2d at 1272. In contrast, here, the prosecutor did not malign the role 
of defense counsel. Instead, he pointed out what defense counsel did, what 
evidence defense counsel elicited, and what evidence counsel did not elicit from 
Helena. (Vol. II Tr., p. 210, L. 20 - p. 211, L. 9.) The prosecutor's closing 
focused on the evidence, not on counsel. 
In Baruth, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's statements, and 
the trial court "immediately issued corrective admonitions" which the appellate 
court found appropriate. Baruth, 107 Idaho at 658, 691 P.2d at 1273. Here, 
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because no objection was made, Denton must demonstrate fundamental error. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 222-23, 228, 245 P.3d at 974-75, 980. Even if the record 
supported clear misconduct, which it does not, Denton cannot show the 
prosecutor's alleged disparagement of counsel affected the outcome of his trial. 
According to Denton, the prosecutor's statements "cause[d] the jury to 
disregard defense counsel's attacks on [Helena's] credibility because ... they 
were improperly or inexpertly presented." (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) But again, 
the prosecutor's comments were not about counsel, they were about the 
evidence. The prosecutor noted that defense counsel never asked Helena about 
an inconsistency in her statement "because he didn't want her to say, that's not 
what I said." (Vol. II Tr., p. 210, Ls. 23-24.) The prosecutor's argument is not 
that defense counsel acted improperly or even inexpertly, but that the jury could 
draw inferences from the omission of specific admissible evidence. The role of 
the jury is to "determine the credibility of the witnesses [and] weigh the 
evidence," State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260,263, 141 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Ct. App. 
2006); the jury's role is not to judge the performances by counsel. As already 
discussed, the court instructed the jury regarding their role. (See Vol. I, p. 168, 
L. 15 - p. 169, L. 7.) We must presume the jury followed court's instruction and 
did not disregard any evidence - whether for or against either party - based on 
their perceptions of counsel's performance. 
Given the record and applicable law, Denton has failed to establish clear 
error or prejudice as to any of his assertions of prosecutorial misconduct. 
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Accordingly, Denton has failed to show fundamental error, and his appeal must 
be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Denton's judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 25th day of June, 2014. 
~25 Deputy Attorney General 
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